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Executive summary 
 
Drawing on elements of a political economy framework, this paper addresses two 
inter-related questions with regard to economic growth and public expenditure 
patterns in Morocco. The main factors that help explain Morocco’s relatively slow 
economic growth for the last few decades have to do with problems of  
 
• representation (policy makers mainly represented their own and family/clan 
interests rather than the public at large);  
 
• coordination (coordination among ministries is constrained by the centralized 
nature of information and power); and  
 
• commitment (to the trade and economic liberalization as well as privatization 
policies, linked to rent seeking activities by certain interests groups).  
 
An overarching trend is the disproportionate influence of political considerations on 
economic decisions. The paper illustrates this point with numerous examples, 
including the tax exemption of the agricultural sector. 
 
The second part of the paper identifies the main causes of Morocco’s disappointing 
social development indicators compared to other middle-income countries. These 
causes are mainly linked to unsatisfactory outcomes in the education sector, and 
weak pro-poor targeting of government programs, which can in turn be explained by 
political economy imperatives discussed in the first part of the paper.   
 
The policy recommendations put forward by this paper to further pro-poor economic 
growth emphasize the need for a reform of the tax system and greater redistribution 
of tax revenues to benefit the poor, as well as easier access to credit. Further, the 
possibilities for a selective decentralization of decision-making in public expenditure 
and greater coordination among development actors are presented. Lastly, the paper 
highlights the need for continued public sector reform, job creation through increased 
investment and improved human capital development. 
 
The paper concludes that to advance the implementation of the many promising 
government strategies, it is above all necessary to reframe these reforms in political 
rather than management terms. 
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Introduction 
 
The main objective of this paper is to use Morocco - a key EU MEDA partner - as a 
case study to illustrate some of the points made in the other papers in this series 
(e.g. Román-Zozaya, 2005). In particular, drawing on elements of a political 
economy framework, this paper will address two inter-related questions. First, the 
factors that explain Morocco’s relatively slow economic growth since independence 
(1956) are examined. Following an introductory section on the economic and political 
context of Morocco’s development achievements and challenges, this discussion will 
be structured around the concepts of representation, coordination and commitment. 
The second question relates to the causes of Morocco’s disappointing social 
development indicators. This section draws primarily on recent findings regarding the 
extent of pro-poor targeting of a number of government programs. The paper 
concludes with some recommendations for enhanced policy effectiveness. 
 
Román-Zozaya (2005) draws on Gilpin and Nelson and the political economy 
approach to explain why some economies are performing better than others. He 
refers to the possibility that entire systems stagnate because of power groups and 
institutional and economic practices, which were key in achieving success yesterday 
but are not suited for today’s needs.1 Similarly, Cherkaoui and Ben Ali (2003) use the 
political economy of growth theory developed in Castanheira and Esfahani (2001) to 
explain why Morocco’s growth rates and overall performance have been very low 
since independence in 1956 both in absolute terms and when compared to those 
countries which started in the 1960’s with relatively similar initial conditions.2 They 
also note the continued high dependence on agriculture (employing around 55 
percent of the workforce in 2000 and accounting for 18.3 percent of GDP3) and the 
limited change in the overall structure of the economy despite the reforms that have 
taken place in the last decades.  
 
It is therefore useful to reformulate the first question above in this way: first, why was 
the system unable to foster incentives for economic agents to invest and improve 
productivity in the long run and second, why were resources not directed toward 
growth enhancing activities? The core idea in the political economy of growth theory 
is that sub-optimal growth outcomes are the result of contracting problems among 
players in the economy. The contracting problems may arise due to weaknesses in 
the representation, commitment and coordination capabilities of the policy makers.  
 
These three institutional features are linked one to the other and a subtle 
combination of the three is required for growth inducing reforms. Each will reinforce 
the other, as for example the development of effective representation may heighten 
the value of government’s commitment to policy The severity of these problems is 
related to the institutions that structure interactions among individuals and groups 
(Cherkaoui and Ben Ali, 2003). Before examining each of these issues in the 
Moroccan case, the next section will provide some background on the economic and 
political context of Morocco’s development achievements and challenges.  
 
                                                 
1
 Douglas North states that ‘[institutions] evolve incrementally, connecting the past to the present, and 
the future; history in consequence is largely a story of institutional evolution in which the historical 
performance of economies can only be understood as a part of a sequential story. Institutions provide 
the incentive structure of an economy; as that structure evolves, it shapes the direction of economic 
change towards growth, stagnation, or decline.’ (cited in Addison and Baliamoune-Lutz, 2003). 
2
 During the 1990s Morocco’s GDP expanded by an average 2.7 percent per year. (Cherkaoui, 2001) 
3
 Agénor, P.-R. and K. El Aynaoui (2003) and World Bank (2004) 
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I. Economic and political context: development achievements and challenges 
 
It has been noted that GDP per capita and overall economic conditions were not 
significantly different between Morocco and some East Asian countries in the 1960’s 
but that divergence in the growth rates in the following decades made Morocco lag 
behind (its average growth rate in the period 1960-2004 was 3.7 percent (Kably, 
2005)). Further, it has been argued that population growth,4 weather conditions and 
mismanagement of economic policy had a negative impact on growth over the 1960 
to 1998 period (Cherkaoui and Ben Ali, 2003).  
 
A recent survey on policy mistakes that account for this slow economic growth 
concludes that the main reason is the disproportionate influence of political 
considerations on economic decisions (La Vie économique 18.2.05). An example is 
the Moroccan capitalist private sector whose legitimacy depended on the makhzen 
(royal palace and central power network) which was largely responsible for its 
creation in the 1970s (see below). Another example of the primacy of political over 
economic considerations is the recruitment of 100,000 young unemployed graduates 
into government jobs in the early 90s, at a time when the budget had only envisaged 
hiring 10,000 new recruits, opening the door to continuing claims to the right of 
government jobs by the ever-increasing numbers of unemployed graduates.  
 
A further important factor explaining the lack of significant growth in the agricultural 
sector is the incomplete land reform after independence: while 1 million hectares of 
land were in the hands of French settlers at the time, the redistribution operation in 
1963 officially only dealt with 300,000 hectares. Hence, it seems quite plausible that 
the remaining 700,000 hectares were given to the already rich and privileged 
Moroccans. Furthermore, the decision to exonerate the agricultural sector from 
taxation in 1980 seems to have been taken more due to political considerations than 
to give an incentive to modern production systems which are still very few. And even 
if the tax on agricultural revenue were reintroduced today, most farmers would not be 
affected since their revenues are below the minimum taxable income tranche, while 
the big landowners would have to pay (ibid citing Najib Akesbi, and see below).  
 
With regard to the industrial sector, the government tried to attract private sector 
investment by applying investment codes. However, they were soon abandoned 
since the incentives were not limited to specific sectors or time periods, but 
generalized to all sectors (ibid citing Mohamed Berrada). A further example of 
political influence in decision making is the policy to address the problem of urban 
slums; since the government promised the right to adequate housing to all those 
living in slums, even people who were not living in slums to begin with moved there 
in order to benefit from this promise (ibid citing Abdelali Benamor).  
 
However, following a structural adjustment program in the 1980s, other 
macroeconomic indicators besides GDP growth have been brought under control. 
The government has restrained inflation (under 3 percent between 1996–1998, and 
about 2 percent in 2000), has kept the external current account deficit below 1 
                                                 
4
 The total population in Morocco increased from 11.5 millions in 1960 to 28.7 millions in 2000. The 
population living in urban centers increased from 25 percent in 1960 to 55 percent in 2000. The 
population is still young. The proportion of the population under 15 represents 32 percent of the 
population despite a sharp reduction when compared to the 1960’s (Cherkaoui, Douidich and Touhami, 
2002). However, a demographic transition is under way, with important implications for pension 
schemes. While currently just 7 per cent of the total population is aged 60 and over, by the year 2020 
that proportion is forecast to exceed 8 per cent (Boudahrain, 2003). 
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percent of GDP until the recent drought and decline of phosphate prices (it is now 
1.5 percent of GDP), and shored up official reserves, mainly thanks to tourism and 
remittance receipts (Cohen, 2003).5 Nevertheless, there is not much scope for a big 
push on social sector spending, since 80 percent of the government’s budget goes to 
recurrent expenditures, compensation (e.g. subsidizing the petrol price for 
consumers) and public debt payments (Tritki, 2005). 
 
Moreover, the effects of integration into the global market economy, whether through 
foreign investment, trade, or privatization, have been very apparent. For young 
entrepreneurs searching for low-risk investment opportunities that require little start-
up capital, the rise in the importation and domestic production of consumer goods 
has created demand for services like market research and advertising. On the other 
hand, annual growth in services (the sector most university and secondary school 
graduates enter) averaged only 2.8 percent during 1990 – 1995. Accordingly, overall 
unemployment rates averaged around 20 percent in the late 1990s (19.0 percent in 
1998) (Cohen, 2003). In particular, unemployed 15-24 year olds account for around 
37 percent and individuals with a higher level of education for more than 18 percent 
of the number of job seekers in 2000 (Agénor and El Aynaoui, 2003). 
 
According to a World Bank Report (2000), the incidence of poverty increased 
between 1990 and 1998 from 13 percent to 19 percent of the population, i.e. an 
increase in the number of poor from 3.4 to 5.3 millions. This was attributed in part to 
the slow growth in the non-manufacturing GDP which was insufficient to compensate 
for the drop in agriculture production following many years of drought. Poverty is 
mainly prevalent in rural areas. If one person out of ten is poor in urban areas, this 
becomes one out of three in rural areas.6  Moreover, income inequality is still very 
important. A survey quoted by the Groupe Agence Française de Development (2000, 
cited in Cherkaoui and Ben Ali, 2003) shows that the richest 10 percent of 
households consume around 30 percent of total consumption, whereas the poorest 
10 percent only consume 2.6 percent of total consumption. This consumption 
difference has increased during the 1990s. Similarly, a person in the urban sector 
consumes twice as much as a person living in a rural area.  
 
In addition, while the increase in poverty in the 1990s was accompanied with an 
improvement in social indicators (such as an increase in enrolment rate in primary 
education, life expectancy, access to basic infrastructure services and a decrease in 
adult illiteracy), Morocco has poor social indicators given its per capita income levels. 
It occupied the 123rd position (out of 178) on the UNDP’s Human Development 
Index (Bougroum and Ibourk, 2003).  
 
For example, despite a clear improvement when compared to the 1960’s, Morocco’s 
illiteracy rate in 1998 was still very high at 49 percent (compared to and average of 
31 percent in the MENA region and 10 percent in the lower middle income country 
group (World Bank, 2004)). Female illiteracy was at almost 62 percent. In the rural 
areas the illiteracy rate was 67 percent overall and 83 percent for women. In the 
urban areas these rates are 34 and 45.5 percent respectively (Cherkaoui and Ben 
Ali, 2003). Concerns have also focused on severely unequal education outcomes as 
reflected in large urban/rural differentials and a substantial gender gap (Van de 
                                                 
5
 According to data from the IMFs Balance of Payments Yearbook, Morocco is the world’s fourth 
largest recipient of official remittances, totalling $3.3 billions in 2002 (Sorensen, 2004). 
6
 Teto (2001) finds that without transfers from resident households, public and private administrations, 
NGOs, Moroccans resident abroad, social transfers and family donations, the poverty incidence would 
be considerably higher.  
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Walle, 2005). Results obtained at national examinations show that the knowledge 
acquired is weak especially for students in the rural sector. This is attributed to the 
predominance given to memorization and the absence of an efficient evaluation 
system (Cherkaoui and Ben Ali, 2003).  
 
Special attention should be given to the role of the monarchy in this discussion of the 
political and economic context of Morocco’s social development.7 As Al-Arkoubi and 
McCourt (2004) point out, power in Morocco centers on the palace.8 In formal terms, 
the 1996 constitution envisages a multiparty system of democracy, but also allows 
the king a lot of executive leeway. The King continues to chair the meetings of his 
‘inner cabinet’ of appointed ministers, at which all the big decisions are taken, and he 
personally appoints the Prime Minister, key central ministers and regional governors. 
In addition, one should not underestimate the king’s baraka (roughly charisma), a 
quasi-religious quality that derives from the monarch’s important religious role.9  
 
Some commentators have been very optimistic about the extent of changes 
introduced by King Mohammed VI, saying that ‘It appears that he is attempting to 
transform subjects into citizens and to replace a culture of personal allegiance with a 
culture of civic responsibility’ (Denoeux, 2001). However, in light of the following 
discussion, it seems more accurate to say that ‘the palace has played groups off 
against each other by the well-judged use of patronage, albeit the modernizing bent 
of both the present king and his father means that recent recipients of patronage 
have often been highly qualified technocrats’ (Al-Arkoubi and McCourt, 2004). As will 
be seen in the following sections, the role of the monarchy is crucial in explaining 
many of the issues to do with representation, coordination and commitment. 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Due to the limited scope of this paper, the other main political actors cannot be discussed here in 
detail, but see Cherkaoui and Ben Ali (2003) for an analysis of the political parties, the administration 
and the civil society. 
8
 See Cherkaoui and Ben Ali (2003:6) for more details. 
9
 With an annual budget of 2.28bn Dirham per year, the Palace is also an important economic actor 
(Ksikes and Tritki, 2004). 
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II. Issues for Moroccan fiscal policy 
 
 
 Representation  
 
Effectiveness in representation refers to the capability of the public to align the 
incentives of policy makers with its broad interests (Castanheira and Esfahani, 
2001). As Cherkaoui and Ben Ali (2003) observe, in that sense it can be discussed in 
terms of electoral rules in developed democratic societies but it might not have the 
same meaning in the developing world. Even in the Moroccan case where multiparty 
system has a long history it is difficult to see that the change in the electoral rule 
would in and by itself change significantly the degree of competition among political 
parties. This is because after independence, the electoral process was designed in 
such a way as to insure control by the central power. Political parties faced very 
limited competition and this restricted their willingness and ability to respond to the 
public broad interests. Furthermore, the alliances of a relatively limited number of 
families and tribes have for the most part dominated the political landscape in 
Morocco (see Douichi, 2005b). In addition, the lack of transparency in government 
decisions and the monopoly it maintained on information meant that no real counter 
power emerged. The press did not enjoy full freedom and was hampered by high 
levels of illiteracy in the population.  
 
All these factors significantly limited representation effectiveness. While the new 
1996 constitution led to the participation of the Koutla (opposition parties’ grouping) 
in government, the hegemony of the Ministry of the Interior was preserved. For the 
September 2002 elections, 26 parties presented candidates. Of these, 11 were 
created in 2001 and 2002. The large number of parties can be attributed to the 
neutralization strategy of the monarchy, but also to a lack of internal promotion, and 
regional and generational considerations. However, it is likely that the growing 
strength of civil society, the reduction of the voting age and the transparency of the 
2002 elections will increase representation effectiveness by the wider public 
(Cherkaoui and Ben Ali, 2003).  
 
This does not mean that other interests were not represented. Indeed, associations 
and interest groups have played an important role in shaping the Moroccan 
economic policies in the last decades. The policies adopted were often biased 
toward the interests of large landowners because these have been more organized 
and better able to defend their interests when compared to small land owners - even 
though they are an overwhelming majority in terms of numbers.10 The divergence 
between the representation of small and large landowners may explain in part some 
agricultural policy choices of the last decades in favor of irrigated agriculture when 
dry agriculture has not received as much attention. It may also in part explain the tax 
amnesty in favor of agricultural production and the subsidies given to this sector, as 
noted above. It is only recently in the 2000-2004 social and economic development 
plan that a more global approach to rural development including the reduction of 
poverty, the improvement of the living conditions of the rural population, the 
diversification of economic activity, the preservation of natural resources, and the 
improvement of competitiveness has been developed (Cherkaoui and Ben Ali, 2003). 
                                                 
10
 The agriculture census conducted in 1996 identifies 1.5 million farms of which 71% have less than 5 
hectares and 0.2% have more than 100 hectares. The farms of more than 100 hectares represent 8.7% 
of the useful agricultural land. Of the 1.5 million farmers, 81% are illiterate. Only 50% use fertilizers, 
16% selected seeds and 33% pesticides (Annuaire Statistique du Maroc, 1999 cited in Cherkaoui and 
Ben Ali (2003)).  
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At the level of industrial sector, Cherkaoui and Ben Ali (2003) also find a 
predominance of large enterprise in terms of their ability to influence policy makers.11 
There is an association of small and medium enterprises in Morocco but it is not as 
influential as the one comprised of large companies.12 The historical development of 
the Moroccan bourgeoisie influenced the ability of large companies to defend their 
interests and influence policy makers. After independence the participation of 
Moroccan firms in the manufacturing sector was very small. This led in 1973 to the 
Moroccanization program, which required that at least Moroccan nationals own at 
least 50 percent of the Moroccan firms. A minority of capitalist families gained control 
over more than 60 percent of the capital involved. This fostered an economic and 
financial concentration of private capital in the hand of a small number of Moroccan 
families.13 While this capital may today be distributed among more actors, it is clear 
that the connection of interests between a private sector oligarchy and the 
administration in the past led to the adoption of policies often in favor of large 
enterprises. Today, it could be argued that banking reforms are producing private 
banking oligopolies and autonomous business groups that will demand political 
pluralism (Clement Henry cited in Dillman, 2001). 
 
 
Coordination 
 
As Castanheira and Esfahani (2001) point out, the efficiency and growth capability of 
a given economy depends in part on its ability to coordinate various activities in order 
to maximize the value of its resources and on its strength in motivating economic 
agents to achieve this potential outcome. In Morocco, coordination regarding specific 
issues among different parties is done through the establishment of large committees 
where a number of representatives of associations and unions are represented.14 At 
this level, problems in coordination result from the fact that the role and functions of 
each body are not clearly identified which often leads to struggle among them as to 
who should take the lead dealing with a specific issue. For example, until 2002, the 
question of coordination has for a long time delayed the establishment of a “one-stop 
shops” for investors (Cherkaoui and Ben Ali, 2003). 
                                                 
11
 Mateus’s study (1988, cited in Al-Arkoubi and McCourt, 2004) shows that representation does not 
necessarily imply taxation (see Cobham, 2005: 2): In his examination of the tax files for ninety large 
firms, Mateus found that they used a blend of three techniques to minimize their exposure to high 
nominal tax rates. Mateus estimated that companies successfully reduced their tax liabilities by DH3.8 
billion in 1986, or approximately 14 percent of total revenue. Moreover, while officials carried out few 
audits, they did, however, reveal the existence of massive fraud: for the 129 audits carried out in 1984, 
the audited tax base was nearly three times as large as the declared base. Finally, enforcement was 
extremely weak in Morocco. While as much as 80 percent of total labor income was included in the 
income tax net, as much as 80 percent of total capital income had managed to elude that net. He 
concludes that large chunks of business-related capital income and the incomes earned by self-
employed professionals effectively escaped income taxation because of weak tax administration. 
12
 The business associations are organized along industry lines and brought together under large 
associations. They are able to defend their interests through various channels. First the important 
business organizations publish a bulletin and use the local newspapers. They also meet regularly with 
the ministers in charge of economic affairs and industry, e.g. ASMEX (the exporters association) 
would meet with the Ministry of trade to express the views of the exporters. Finally they have access to 
high officials through social and familial connections (Cherkaoui and Ben Ali, 2003). 
13
 Indeed, a study in 1978 showed that the 58 richest families controlled a quarter of all the private 
capital invested in the Moroccan industry (Clément 1986). 
14
 As indicated above, recent governments have been coalitions drawn from the plethora of political 
parties, with all the problems of agreeing a common program that bedevil coalitions everywhere (Al-
Arkoubi and McCourt, 2004). 
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Coordination problems are most apparent during budget preparations. Apart from a 
host of other problems,15 coordination problems arise from the fact that line agencies 
do not participate in the planning process. Instead, to achieve coordination, the 
Moroccan budget uses both ex-ante agreements among cabinet ministers and 
delegation of responsibility to the Ministry of Finance (MoF) for the design and 
implementation of the budget. The MoF holds bilateral negotiations with other 
ministries but usually its view dominates. This is reinforced by the fact that 
information is most often lacking, and that the legislature cannot make changes that 
would either increase or decrease the deficit (Cherkaoui, 2001). Hence, coordination 
among ministries is constrained by the centralized nature of information and power 
(notably in the MoF and the Ministry of the Interior), and the large number of 
ministries (34), many of which are ‘empty shells’ and created to satisfy the political 
demands of the many new parties (Douichi, 2005). A related issue is the deep-
seated inclination of political actors to hold the ring between opposing factions rather 
than to initiate actions, with the related clientelistic preference for keeping every 
option open without committing oneself irrevocably to any one (Al-Arkoubi and 
McCourt, 2004).   
 
 
Commitment 
 
As Castanheira and Esfahani (2001) state, we should expect to observe sub-
optimally low growth in countries where the government cannot commit to follow its 
announced policies. In Morocco, the support of late King Hassan II to the trade and 
economic liberalization of the early 1980’s played an important role in insuring 
commitment to these reforms despite the reluctance of various interest groups 
(Cherkaoui and Ben Ali, 2003). The January 1984 riots were triggered by rumours 
that the official proposals (made at the end of December 1983) to increase the price 
of basic commodities, including food, were going to be implemented. The social 
unrest was a response to the fact that reforms ignored some basic realities, namely 
that food items, particularly bread, do not only have an economic (consumption) 
value but they play a cultural role as well, especially for the low-income groups 
(Addison and Baliamoune-Lutz, 2003). Nevertheless, in the face of IMF pressure to 
adopt a rapid approach to reform, the Moroccan side entertained a wide range of 
opinions across government, and even the IMF came to admit that the gradual pace 
of the reform program that emerged and the care taken to address the public’s 
anxieties contributed to its success (Al-Arkoubi and McCourt, 2004).   
 
Commitment problems can be addressed by fixing major elements of reforms into 
laws (e.g. trade and privatization law), international agreements (e.g. free trade 
association agreement with Europe) and constitutional clauses. This significantly 
reduces the risk of policy reversal and time inconsistency. However, within this 
framework it is still sometimes possible to delay or circumvent the reforms by not 
putting sufficient efforts in their efficient implementation (Cherkaoui and Ben Ali, 
2003). 
                                                 
15
 To do with fiscal discipline, accountability and the lack of sanctions, which make the budget 
sensitive to political pressures to overspend, especially on the wage expenditure front. This is in turn 
due to the power of Morocco’s three trade unions who in 2001 were able to negotiate a 10 percent 
increase in the minimum wage and a significant boost in remunerations in the public sector, despite 
low inflation and tight budget constraints (Agénor and El Aynaoui, 2003). As in other countries, the 
budget is also very sensitive to fluctuations in the price of oil and to variations in international interest 
rates. Moreover, in Morocco, the use of cost benefit analysis in programs assessment is very rare, and 
the national development plan decisions are only indicative (Cherkaoui, 2001). 
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This point is well illustrated by the adoption of the new trade policy. While it was 
detrimental to the industries based on import substitution, a large number of 
industries were hindered in their growth because of the unavailability of imported 
inputs. Furthermore, exporting firms and large land owners exporting citrus fruits and 
other agricultural products wanted to take advantage of the proximity to Europe. The 
latter were also interested in getting inputs (such as tractors and seeds) at lower 
prices. More importantly, their professional association informed the large 
enterprises of the new policies and they probably had sufficient time to adjust their 
portfolio to take upcoming changes into account (Cherkaoui and Ben Ali, 2003).  
 
Nevertheless, the new trade policy went against the interest of many employees of 
the administration who perceived their position as an important source of rents 
coming from the granting of licenses and “special” exemptions from import duties. 
This was thanks to the fact that the Moroccan economy is relatively well endowed 
with natural resources. There is a good agricultural land, important phosphate 
reserves and minerals, a great tourism potential as well as significant fisheries 
resources.16 At the same time it was easy to justify their positions against free trade 
on the basis of the possible decline of tariff revenues (representing some 25 percent 
of current expenditures in the early 1980s) and the need for reducing the budget 
deficit (Cherkaoui and Ben Ali, 2003).17  
 
Herein lies a strong explanation for Morocco’s slow growth - rent seeking activities by 
interests groups arguably leads to a lack of competition for some major domestic 
industries. In other words, the existence of these rents tends to direct the public 
resources to these sectors and divert them away from more growth inducing sectors. 
The profit expectations of rent seekers are slow to adjust as they adopt a defensive 
attitude to keep their privilege for as long as possible. Since rent seekers includes 
politicians who distribute rents to secure their power, the most desirable economic 
policies become those that are susceptible to allow rent extraction (Cherkaoui and 
Ben Ali, 2003).  
 
However, liberalization of the economy does not necessarily result in the reduction or 
suppression of rents as the state can continue to control the polity through rent 
distribution despite liberalization (Cherkaoui and Ben Ali, 2003).18 Apart from the 
                                                 
16
 Sewell and Thirsk (1997) note that in the mid-1970s, the price of phosphate rock, a major export that 
accounted for roughly one-third of export revenues, more than tripled. As a result, the economy grew 
unusually rapidly in 1975 and 1976. Government revenue, especially transfers from the state-owned 
phosphate monopoly, also grew quickly and allowed the government to embark on an ambitious new 
expenditure program that involved higher levels of both investment and current spending. 
Concurrently, the Saharan War brought about a large buildup in military spending. Unfortunately, the 
export boom did not last long. Even if it had continued for longer, it could not have sustained the 
enormous concurrent increase in government expenditure and debt. 
17
 Interestingly, the reduction in trade tariffs did not affect revenues significantly. Indeed, not only did 
it force the government to undertake a long-overdue customs administration reform, but revenue from 
import taxes and duties has remained stable since 1998 despite progressive tariff reductions 
(particularly on imports from the EU). The revenue reduction was offset by a rise in value added tax 
revenue from imports thanks to increased commercial activity, so that customs revenue remained a 
constant proportion of overall budget resources, around 46 percent or slightly more, from 1998 through 
2002 (Steenlandt, and De Wulf (2004). However, Martín (2004) points out that each additional year of 
tariff dismantling until 2012 will cause an extra Euro 50 million of tariff revenue loss for Morocco. He 
calculates that in order to compensate for this loss with an increase in VAT receipts, the latter should 
grow at a rate of 2.9% each year up to 2012.  
18
 Schlumberger (2000) states that ‘since material gains and rewards are more likely to be achieved by 
loyalty and personal contacts or friendship than by productivity, rational micro economic behavior 
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gains from privatization, which will be discussed in a moment, this can also take the 
form of tax exemptions (see above on agriculture). As Mateus (cited in Al-Arkoubi 
and McCourt, 2004) concludes, while acknowledging how far the tax system has 
moved toward simplification and more uniform treatment of all taxpayers since 
passage of the 1984 Framework Law, perhaps the tax system's most striking feature 
remains the number of instances in which it singles out particular sectors of the 
economy for special treatment.19  Yet another form of rent extraction happens on an 
individual basis: A recent survey concluded that there are 80,000 ‘phantom’ civil 
servants in the Moroccan administration, i.e. persons who do not appear to be 
working but are receiving government salaries (Chaoui, 2005). 
 
In terms of the liberalization of the private sector, Dillman (2001) found that 
incumbent elites in North Africa can forestall democratisation by a selective 
engagement with global markets that maintains distributional coalitions and co-opts a 
largely dependent domestic private sector. Furthermore, he notes that the more 
regimes ‘deregulate’, the more they ‘re-regulate’ by determining precisely who can 
most easily benefit from change and join distributional coalitions to tap profits in the 
market. For example, in Morocco, some 30 large families tied personally to King 
Hassan were said to be the chief beneficiaries of liberalization in the late 1980s. 
Moreover, cannabis and hashish have become the country’s most valuable export 
items, bringing in an estimated $3 billion a year. It is ironic to note that this important 
‘private sector’ activity in which high public officials are accused of being involved 
has thrived in the free market environment into which Morocco has thrown itself.  
 
At the same time, privatisation does not necessarily increase competition; in most 
North African countries, privatised assets have often been sold below market value 
to small groups of investors, increasing their oligarchic control of markets.20 
Engaging the market this ways has less to do with generating efficiency than picking 
winners and loosers. However, Dillman notes that Morocco has been one of most 
successful privatizers in the region.21 The extent to which liberalization has had the 
impact of reducing control over the rent and inducing a greater reliance on a merit-
based system still needs to be fully evaluated (Cherkaoui and Ben Ali, 2003). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                           
does include the principle of maximizing gains as is assumed in classical economics, but gains are not 
necessarily, and not even primarily, realized through successful competition in an open market’. 
19
 See Cobham (2005:11) for trends in Morocco’s taxation levels up to 1999. According to Ageniou 
(2004) since 1999, direct taxes such as the taxes on revenues and companies are progressing the most. 
Citing estimates by the Ministry of Finance, in 2004, direct taxes amounted to 36bn Dirhams while 
indirect taxes contributed 34bn Dirham whereof 25bn of VAT (domestic and those on imports). 
20
 Speaking of the Arab state in general, Ayubi (cited in Younis, 1996) notes that actual privatizations 
remain rather limited and the Arab state is not about to withdraw from the economy. Privatization is 
still basically a public policy that is pursued by the state with reluctance and for its own purposes; it 
has not yet become a dynamic process whose initiative is taken by the private sector itself. If the 
private sector is gaining it is not because of its initiative, drive and organization; rather, it is mainly 
because the state can no longer continue with its étatiste and welfare policies at the same time. In other 
words, the private sector may end up growing “by default” so to speak. 
21
 From 1993 to 1998, privatisation had garnered $1.9 billion for the government (Dillman, 2001). 
Cohen (2003) notes that , foreign investment - responding in part to the privatization of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) in utilities, infrastructure, telecommunications, and derivative industries of natural 
resources - has risen dramatically over recent years, reaching $1.2 billion in 1997, four times the 1996 
figure, and 3.5 percent of GDP. However, foreign direct investment dropped in 1998 to 1.6 percent of 
GDP, but jumped again in 1999 to 5.4 percent, probably reflecting the large one-off sales of the most 
profitable SOEs. 
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III. Explaining Morocco’s poor social development indicators 
 
This paper now turns to the second question stated at the beginning, i.e. the causes 
behind Morocco’s disappointing social development indicators compared to other 
middle-income countries. The situation can partly be explained by referring to the 
issues of representation, co-ordination and commitment (and especially the 
discussion on rents within the latter) discussed above, all of which mean that 
available resources are distributed overwhelmingly in favor of the privileged classes.  
 
A second factor is the investment in human capital (see Román-Zozaya, 2005). 
Indeed, this element might also in part explain the sources of differences between 
the growth experiences of South Asia and Morocco. The former, having invested 
heavily and efficiently in building its human capital, was able to enter the virtuous 
circle of more human capital inducing stronger institutions, themselves calling for 
more investment in human capital. In contrast, Morocco’s investment in education 
was always important as a share of GDP but was not efficient enough. 22 Moreover, 
while education reforms often called for the use of Arabic instead of French based on 
nationalistic rhetoric, they were not successful in improving the quality of education. 
In fact the elimination in 1983 of compulsory French instruction led to an important 
decrease in the returns to schooling (Cherkaoui and Ben Ali, 2003). 
 
Thirdly, the big urban/rural divide that was noted at the beginning can be explained 
by the nature of past public provision of services, which was uneven and long 
focused on urban areas. This is because along with other functions, responsibility for 
rural infrastructure was decentralized to communes (municipalities) in 1976, yet no 
provision for financing was made at the time. Richer communes are likely to have 
better provided for their populations. As communes generally lack investment 
budgets, little investment occurred until the 1990s when the state woke up to the 
extent of the rural infrastructure problem. Since then, there has been a concerted 
effort to remedy the situation through new national programs to more widely provide 
electricity (PERG), water (PAGER), and rural roads (PNCRR). A poor area 
development program begun in 1996─ BAJ1 ─ has focused on basic health, 
education and infrastructure investments in 14 targeted poor provinces. However, 
practically nothing is known about the impact of these programs, let alone their 
incidence or even their beneficiaries. Much of the data necessary to assess these 
issues at the household level are simply not available (Van de Walle, 2005). 
 
A recent World Bank Working Paper on Morocco (Van de Walle, 2005)23 has used a 
new technique to overcome these data constraints, and examines to what extent 
public policy programs have been pro-poor in their targeting.24 Using a province-level 
                                                 
22
 See also Laframboise and Trumbic (2003:24-25), who conclude that the weak performance in female 
social indicators in the MENA region, particularly in the area of education, is not explained by the 
amount of government spending, but rather must be attributed to the effectiveness of existing spending, 
including issues such as access, availability, efficiency, allocation, and targeting. 
23
 For which the author was involved in the data collection. 
24
 The findings in Van de Walle (2005) are based on a methodology developed by Ravallion, 
measuring targeting performance by exploiting the spatial variances in both program spending and 
poverty incidence across regions. The inter-regional targeting differential is estimated by regressing 
program allocations across regions on the regional poverty measure. Van de Walle (2005) stresses that 
the results reported in her paper must be seen as preliminary and only indicative of likely targeting 
performance. They need to be rigorously investigated and assessed using household level information 
on program participation. 
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database,25 it shows that of all the spending programs reviewed, a majority are 
estimated to significantly benefit both the rural poor and the urban non-poor, i.e. 
neglecting the urban poor.  For example, the results suggest that the health 
ministry’s 1997/98 (net of salaries) allocations across provinces were biased against 
poorer areas. Equally, the PAGER rural potable water investment program for which 
two years of data (1995 and 2002) are available reveals a lack of pro-poor targeting 
and there are no signs of improvements in targeting over time. Similarly, the budgets 
allocated to NGO literacy or poverty programs do not appear to be targeted to the 
poor.26 However, the inter-provincial distribution of the total Ministry of Education 
budget of 2001 (also net of salaries) show considerable signs of pro-poor targeting. 
The analysis also revealed evidence of impressive progress in primary and 
secondary school enrolments for the poor as well as for poor girls since 1994. 
However, here too, the gains are found to have been concentrated on the rural poor 
while the urban poor appear not to have particularly benefited. Of course, the paper 
is unable to say whether increases in school enrolments have translated into 
improved school outcomes such as test scores, grade completion, literacy and skills. 
There are also hints that the newly implemented demand-driven Social Development 
Agency (ADS) is successfully targeting poor people, though the statistical evidence 
is not conclusive.  
 
Van de Walle (2005) explains her main finding, i.e. that while targeting is pro-poor in 
rural provinces, it is often pro-non-poor in urban areas for the same programs, by 
referring – among other factors – to a political economy imperative of leaking some 
benefits to urban elites whose taxes most likely fund many programs in order to 
concentrate the rest of the benefits on the poorest of the poor - those in rural 
Morocco. The discussion in the first part of the paper seems to support this view. 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 The database includes public expenditure data to measure differences in service provisioning, but it 
also includes other factors which play a role in the geographic disparities in living standards, such as 
local characteristics including terrain, isolation, soil quality, access to water, agricultural and growth 
potential, and vulnerability to drought and other climatic shocks.  Population characteristics such as 
cultural norms, the status of women, the degree of community solidarity and whether households are 
spread out or live clustered together will also play a role (Van de Walle, 2005).   
26
 However, it is important to note that allocations are influenced by considerations other than a 
province’s incidence of poverty. For example, literacy programs may put more weight on the illiteracy 
rate in deciding where to distribute their resources. Programs may spend more in more urbanized areas 
where access and implementation is easier. Rural poverty in Morocco is related to rainfall and the risk 
of drought. Thus the average amount of rainfall in a province may well affect the distribution of 
spending on poverty programs. Indeed, consistently across programs, one finds that higher rainfall 
reduced the amounts going the non-poor. A high province level literacy rate tends to positively affect 
the amount of the 2001 Education budget allocated to the poor while reducing that going to the non-
poor. This is consistent with a possible political response to demand on the part of more educated poor 
(Van de Walle, 2005). 
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IV. Policy recommendations and conclusions 
 
Reform of the tax system: As noted above, mainly for political reasons, tax 
exemptions for important sectors of the economy continue to be applied. In addition, 
Ageniou (2004) points out that the tax base is very narrow, given that company taxes 
are levied on only 88 375 companies and income taxes on 2.66 million taxpayers, 
mainly government-wage earners (more than half of all formal sector jobs are in the 
public sector). This is combined with a growing informal sector. According to the 
Statistics Directorate, the informal sector (not including the agricultural sector) in 
1999-2000 had a turnover of 166bn Dirham by 1,2 million enterprises, sustaining 18 
percent of the total number of households in Morocco. Apart from the need to bring 
these businesses into the formal economy, Ageniou and others have emphasized 
the need to increase the efficiency of VAT collection. Citing a recent IMF study, 49 
percent of final household consumption is exonerated from VAT. This means a loss 
of a tax base of 130bn Dirhams, and 26bn Dirhams in lost tax revenue, if applying 
the most frequently applied VAT rate of 20 percent. Another reason for the 
inefficiency of VAT collection are its multiple rates of 20, 14, 10 and 7 percent. 
Following Lebanon’s policy (since 2002) of applying a single VAT rate of 10 percent, 
for example, would be more efficient.     
 
Greater redistribution of tax revenues to benefit the poor and easier access to 
credit: As Cobham (2005:iii) points out, human poverty in middle-income countries 
such as Morocco has more to do with income inequality than with low income levels 
per se. Policy makers should therefore consider cash transfers as a means to 
redistribute incomes and alleviate poverty, especially among the urban poor, but also 
the rural poor who will be the most affected by increased trade liberalization in 
agriculture. This presupposes better data at the household level to assess the cost-
effectiveness of existing poverty and social programs (such as Entraide Nationale, 
Promotion Nationale, and the BAJ Social Priorities Programs, see World Bank, 2002 
for details) and to feed into policy reform (Van de Walle, 2005). Valuable lessons 
could be learned from Mexico’s rural income support programs such as 
Progresa/Oportunidades and Alianza para el campo designed to mitigate the effects 
of NAFTA. An even more important measure, but politically not very feasible, would 
be to redistribute agricultural lands (and/or change inheritance laws which lead to 
ever smaller sizes of plots) so that the small landowners could benefit from 
economies of scale, modern production systems, and increased collateral for access 
to credits. Currently, access to financial services for the poor is limited, as micro-
finance institutions serve only a small fraction of the demand for services from the 
low-income population, and cannot offer deposits or savings products – see World 
Bank (2003), El Khezzari (2005) and Benjamaa (2005). 
 
Selective decentralization of decision-making in public expenditure and 
greater coordination among development actors: With an expanded tax base and 
hence greater tax revenues, and a greater commitment to a policy of cash transfers, 
the main issue then becomes one of clearly defining the responsibilities of the 
central, regional, provincial, and municipal levels with regard to social development 
spending. At the moment the important decisions are still taken at the central level, 
despite recent formal changes (e.g. adoption of a new municipal charter in 2002). 
The fact that local governments have a very limited visibility in terms of the following 
year’s budget means that it is often not allocated in an efficient way or addressing 
local needs (Cherkaoui, 2001). Nevertheless, the superior local knowledge of 
municipalities and communities about local conditions should be used to improve 
targeting to households.  
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This implies that communities must be given discretionary power to allocate benefits. 
But as Pritchett (2005: 24) points out, this discretion could either lead to superior 
targeting or to elite capture, or to community pressures for more “spreading” of the 
benefits. Hence, government agencies and donors working on governance issues 
and local capacity building in Morocco (e.g. USAID) should take into account that 
social institutions and the political power structure are major conditions that 
determine the impact of decentralization on poverty reduction (Jütting et al., 2004).  
 
Moreover, the multiplicity of actors on the development arena (not only ‘vertically, i.e. 
from central to local levels, but also ‘horizontally’, e.g. the new Social Development 
Agency and the Ministry of Social Development, Family and Solidarity as well as 
many other Ministries and countless bilateral and multilateral donor projects) requires 
much stronger coordination and sharing of information to avoid the concentration of 
resources on specific ‘trendy’ but not necessarily most needy regions (such as the 
Souss-Massa-Draa region).  
 
Reform of the public sector: While past attempts at public sector reform have 
correctly identified problems and solutions (i.e. reduce corruption, rationalize public 
expenditures, increase transparency and strengthen the rule of law), they have 
received little application due to the constraints identified above. The recently signed 
EU-World Bank public administration reform loan is mainly aimed at curbing the 
expanding wage bill.27   
 
Job creation through increased investment… : While the above cited measures 
are necessary, they should not distract from the fact that incentives for more private 
domestic and foreign investment are needed to create employment opportunities and 
hence lead to economic growth. This could be achieved by reinforcing current efforts 
to elaborate regional growth strategies according to the regions’ comparative 
advantages. This would stimulate competition for private investment among regions.  
 
… and improved human capital development: In terms of human capital 
development, apart from the difficulties involved in making primary education 
generally available, the education system also suffers from the lack of a clear policy 
on language, and this has a very negative effect on the quality of state education. 
Thus it is both urgent and necessary to start reforming the education system, giving 
absolute priority to widespread availability of quality basic education equipping each 
pupil with the same language skills (Bougroum and Ibourk, 2003). 
 
* 
 
In light of the above discussion and recommendations, it seems that the first step for 
policy makers should really be to reframe taxation, public sector, and institutional 
reforms in political rather than management terms, i.e. as overcoming entrenched 
positions due to long-standing privileges which present representation and 
coordination arrangements entail. This would permit the development of (objective) 
targeting mechanisms that would ensure that public expenditures reach the most 
needy. Such a reframing of the issues would also start to address more realistically 
how the big urban-rural inequality divide could be overcome in a socially sustainable 
way.  
 
                                                 
27
 In 2004, the wage bill accounted for 12,5% of GDP and this will grow to 12,8% this year, making it 
the highest proportion ever. 
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